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PROBABLE CAUSE: THE FEDERAL STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment establishes freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures and provides that "no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause."1 Although the courts are in complete
agreement on generalized principles, they have long struggled with
the question of what factual situations may constitute probable
cause. In the final analysis the term describes a legal concept, the
definition of which is used to guide and inform, rather than make,
decision of each case on its particular facts. However, the manner
in which that definition is used and applied by the federal courts
today is of extreme importance to an attorney in attempting to
predict whether probable cause exists in his client's case.
For years, the federal standard of probable cause, along with
other aspects of the federal law of search and seizure, was of only
minor interest to the average practitioner because it had been held
that the requirements of the fourth amendment did not apply to
the states.2 Each state was free to formulate its own requirements
on the subject, including its own standard of probable cause. With
the Supreme Court's ruling in Mapp v. Ohio3 there followed much
speculation as to whether a federal standard or some other stand-
ard should be used to test the validity of searches and seizures by
state officers. At least five different views were taken by different
state courts on this question 4 before the Supreme Court finally
decided the issue in Ker v. California.
I U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3 367 U.S. 643 (1961), holding that the guarantees of the fourth amendment
against unreasonable search and seizure apply to the states by virtue of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the exclusionary rule prevents
the use of evidence in state courts if such evidence is seized in the course of an
unconstitutional search.
4 13 Drake L. Rev. 65, n. 4, describes the following five positions: (a) that Mapp
indicated a federal standard should be used, citing State v. Trumbull, 23 Conn. Supp.
41, 176 A2d 887 (1961) ; Commonwealth v. Spofford, 180 N.E2d 673 (Mass. 1962) ;
(b) that Mapp did not require a federal standard, citing Smith v. State, 138 So. 2d
474 (Ala. 1962) ; Castaneda v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1963) ;
Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1962) ; State v. Chance, 71 N.J.S. 77, 176 A2d
307 (1962); State v. Scharfstein, 73 N.J.S. 486, 180 A2d 210 (1962); Rees v.
Commonwealth, 127 S.E2d 406 (Va. 1962) ; (c) that federal cases are only persua-
sive and not binding authority, citing State v. Chance, supra, State v. Scharfstein,
supra; (d) that federal authorities are controlling where state authority is inconsistent
in the same matter, citing Castaneda v. Superior Court, supra; Leveson v. State,
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In Ker the Court held that the federal standard of reasonable-
ness does apply to state court cases and that it is the same standard
that applies to cases in the federal courts. Since a search without
probable cause is an unreasonable search, the federal standard of
probable cause therefore applies to the states along with all other
federal standards of reasonableness. In determining probable cause,
the Court in Ker used the definition previously set forth in the
leading cases involving federal law enforcement agencies.6 The
Court in Ker did hold that the states would not be precluded from
establishing workable rules governing search and seizure calculated
to consider local factors, but this concession to the states was con-
ditioned on the proviso that such state rules satisfy the federal
standard. Consequently, the federal minimum standard must be
reckoned with today in every case involving the law of search and
seizure, regardless of the forum.
Before examining how the courts have defined and applied
"probable cause," it should be noted that the fourth amendment
applies to the area of arrest as well as search.7 Consequently, the
question whether probable cause has been shown arises in the appli-
cation for any warrant, whether it be for the purpose of arrest or
search. In addition, the common law right of a peace officer to
arrest without a warrant was not eliminated by the fourth amend-
ment 8 and statutes 9 generally grant such power to law enforcement
officials where they have reasonable grounds or cause to believe that
a crime has been committed. The terms "reasonable grounds" or
"cause" in these statutes have been held to carry the same mean-
ing as the words "probable cause" in the fourth amendment. 10
Finally, the concept also arises where there is a search without a
warrant pursuant to or incident to an arrest. In the arrest area the
requirement is that there be probable cause to believe the offense
has been committed by the person arrested, while in the search
area the requirement is that there be probable cause to believe that
the item sought is present where the search is conducted. However,
the standard is identified by the words "probable cause" in
both cases.
supra; (e) that Mapp only required the reasonableness to fall within the standard of
the fourteenth amendment, citing Smith v. State, supra; Rees v. Commonwealth,
supra.
5 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
6 Id. at 35. The Court used the definition of Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
7 See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
8 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1958).
l0 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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II. A DEFINITION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
It has often been stated by the Supreme Court that each case
must be decided on its own separate facts and that there is no
formula for the determination of reasonableness. 1 As uninforma-
tive as this statement is, it is no doubt the most accurate statement
that can be made of the Supreme Court's application of the term.
However, there are several general definitions of probable cause
which have been given by the Supreme Court and which are often
quoted by it and by lower courts regardless of the result reached in
a given case.
In Carroll v. United States,' the Court said,
[Probable cause exists where] the facts and circumstances within
[the arresting officer's] knowledge and of which they had reason-
ably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [an offense
has been or is being committed.]"3
And in Brinegar v. United States,4 the Court quoted the language
of the Carroll case and in addition stated,
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which . . . prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.15
Finally, both Brinegar and Carroll quote with approval the language
employed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in McCartky v.
De Armit: "The substance of all the definitions [of probable
cause] is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt." 16
FACTORIAL ANALYSIS: FACTORS CONSIDERED
Having looked at the general definitions of probable cause,
the next questions are what factors may be considered in forming
these definitions and what quantum is sufficient to meet the stand-
11 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
12 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'3 Id. at 162; see also Brinegar v. United States, msipra note 6, at 175; Husty v.
United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931) ; Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435,
441 (1925) ; Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1925) ; Stacey v. Emery,
97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
14 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
15 Id. at 175.
16 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881).
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ard. First of all, in spite of the dictum in Grau v. United States ' 7
to the effect that evidence competent in a jury trial is required to
show probable cause,' such is not the case. A finding of probable
cause is perfectly permissible on the basis of evidence which would
not be competent at a trial. No doubt this fact derives from the
distinction between the two things to be proved: probable cause
and guilt. Whereas guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial, probable cause requires only a showing of
probabilities. The large difference between the two things to be
proved is reflected in the quantum and modes of proof required to
establish them.'9 Consequently, the probable cause requirement
may be met although the proof on which it rests is insufficient to
prove guilt or would be inadmissible at a trial to prove guilt.
The factors or elements tending to establish probable cause
which a court might consider in any given case are, of course,
innumerable. However, a glance at specific factors the Supreme
Court has considered or refused to consider, and the weight given
them, may prove helpful.
Area
On several occasions the Supreme Court has emphasized that
the defendant was arrested and searched in a geographical area
that tended to indicate the commission of a crime by the defendant.
The first case involving this factor was The Appollon,20 where the
issue was whether the seizure of a French vessel at a particular
point was upon probable cause that she was there for the purpose
of smuggling. Mr. Justice Story, writing for the Court, stated that
the Court was bound to take judicial notice of public facts and geo-
graphical positions and that it was a matter of general notoriety
and public record that the remote part of the country in which the
seizure occurred had been infested with smugglers at different
periods of time. In United States v. Lee,2' the Court found prob-
able cause to believe that revenue laws were being violated where
the arresting Coast Guard officers came upon two schooners
anchored side-by-side at night, twenty-four miles offshore in "Rum
Row." Again the area was notorious for illicit liquor running. In
the Carroll and Brinegar cases the knowledge of the arresting offi-
cers was much more extensive than that of the officers in the two
17 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
18 Wagner v. United States, 8 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1925), and Giles v. United
States, 284 Fed. 208 (1st Cir. 1922), were cited by the Court to support this propo-
sition.
19 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
20 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 361 (1824).
21 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
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cases mentioned above. In both Carroll and Brinegar the officers
recognized the defendants personally from past incriminating con-
duct witnessed by the officers. But, again, in both of these cases
the Court, in finding probable cause, emphasized the fact that the
defendants were suspected of illicit liquor traffic and that they were
driving through active bootlegging territory in the direction of the
illicit liquor market and away from the largest source of supply.
In neither case did the respective defendants' conduct or appear-
ance at the time of arrest indicate the violation of any law at that
particular time.
In Henry v. United States,22 the officers, suspecting the defend-
ants were involved in a recent interstate whiskey shipment theft,
watched them pick up packages from an alley in a residential
section. The Court, in finding a lack of probable cause for the
defendants' arrest and the search of their car, noted the lack of
any guilty inference arising from the area of their operations, and
stated that the case might have been different if the packages had
been picked up from a terminal or interstate trucking platform.
Finally, the latest case to consider geographic area as a factor
indicates that the factor in itself is certainly not sufficient to con-
stitute probable cause and that perhaps it will no longer be given
the weight it was given in the past. In this case, Rios v. United
States,23 two Los Angeles plain clothes policemen observed a taxi-
cab standing in a parking lot next to an apartment house and saw
the defendant look up and down the street, walk across the lot, and
get into the cab. Neither officer had ever seen the defendant
before and neither had any idea of his identity. Neither offi-
cer had received any information that anyone was engaged in
criminal activity at that time or place, but the neighborhood had
a reputation which, coupled with the defendant's manner, led the
officers to believe that he was engaged in the commission of a crime.
The officers followed the cab for several blocks, and when it stopped
for a traffic light, they walked up on both sides, identified them-
selves, and opened the door. At that point the defendant dropped
a package of narcotics on the floor, and one officer grabbed the
package while the other grabbed the defendant. The Supreme
Court, without deciding when the arrest took place, held that there
was no probable cause for the arrest if it took place when the offi-
cers took their places at the doors of the cab, rather than when
defendant dropped the package.24
22 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
23 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
24 It seems likely that the Court would hold that the arrest had occurred when
the officers took their places at the doors if it were ever forced to answer the
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If the Rios case is compared with The Appollon 25 and United
States v. Lee,26 it appears that the Court has given the geographi-
cal factor much less weight in the establishment of probable cause
in Rios than in the two earlier cases. However, these cases may
perhaps be harmonized by recognition of the fact that there is more
reason to stress the geographical factor in cases on the high sea
than in the normal case where a land area is involved. There is
more reason to suspect one of illegal activity by reason of his pres-
ence in a remote and suspicious area at sea than by reason of his
presence in a heavily populated urban area, regardless of its sus-
picious character.
In any event, the holding in Rios is not at all surprising in
light of United States v. Di Re2 7 In that case, an informant notified
government agents that he was to buy counterfeit gasoline coupons
at a given date and place. The agents were there on the stated date
and, when they approached the car, the informant showed them
the coupons and pointed out the person on the seat beside him as
the seller. The defendant was also in the car, but the informant
made no reference to him. The Supreme Court held that the arrest
and search of the defendant were made without probable cause since
his mere presence in the car proved nothing. Since presence in a
car in which a specific crime is being committed is not sufficient,
in itself, to constitute probable cause, it is only logical that pres-
ence in a geographical area with a reputation for illegal activity
is likewise insufficient and ought to be given somewhat less weight
in the establishment of probable cause than the early cases seemed
to accord it.
Previous Criminal Activity
Another factor which the Supreme Court has considered in
the establishment of probable cause is recent contact between the
arresting officers and the defendant which indicated that the de-
fendant was engaged in illegal activity at the time of contact and
therefore might also be so engaged at the time of arrest. Although
other persuasive factors have been present each time this factor has
been presented in a case before the Supreme Court, it is interesting
to note that in all of the cases where it has been so presented, the
Court has found probable cause for the arrest and search. In Carroll
question. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), where it was conceded
by the government that the arrest took place at the time the car was stopped in a
similar situation.
25 Supra note 20.
26 Supra note 21.
27 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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v. United States,8 the arresting officers had met the defendants
while posing as prospective buyers of illicit whiskey. The defend-
ants, after negotiating a deal -to sell such whiskey to the officers,
left the apartment and never returned with the whiskey. More than
two months later the officers were on patrol when the defendants
drove past them. The officers recognized the car and the defend-
ants; they stopped the car, searched it, and found sixty-eight bottles
of illicit whiskey. In Brinegar v. United States,29 the arresting offi-
cers were similarly on patrol when the defendant drove past in a
car which appeared heavily loaded. One of the officers had arrested
the defendant five months earlier for illegally transporting liquor
and had seen him loading liquor into his car on several other
occasions. And in JHusty v. United States, 0 the arresting officer
received information which he believed reliable that the defendant
possessed illegal liquor in a specific automobile at a particular loca-
tion. In all three of these cases the Court laid heavy emphasis on
the personal contact between the respective officers and defendants
and the knowledge acquired therefrom in arriving at a finding of
probable cause.
Probably the most controversial and most recurrent factor
present in cases today is that of the hearsay statement of the third
party informant. A more exhaustive discussion of this area will be
attempted below, but suffice it to say at this point that such state-
ments are considered by the Court.3 ' There would seem to be some
misunderstanding among the lower courts as to what weight the
Supreme Court's standard accords the informer's statement, but
there is no disagreement that it may be considered, since, as was
noted above, evidence need not be of a type admissible at trial in
order to be considered on a question of probable cause.
Time
The Court may feel compelled to hold that probable cause
does not exist where the period of time elapsing between the
acquisition of knowledge of the facts which lead an officer to believe
that a crime is being committed and the issuance of a warrant or
an arrest without a warrant is too long. The Supreme Court's
statement on this factor is found in Sgro v. United States: 3 2 "[I]t is
manifest that the proof must be of facts so closely related to the
time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable
28 Supra note 12.
29 Supra note 14.
30 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
31 See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) ; Jones v. United States,
supra note 19.
32 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
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cause at that time."33 That case involved the construction of a
statute which provided for the issuance of a warrant.s4 The statute
used the term "probable cause" and the Court found that no such
probable cause existed where the warrant was issued on July
twenty-seventh, the evidence having been compiled and presented
on July sixth.3s
FACTORIAL ANALYSIS: FACTORS EXCLUDED
Submission to Arrest
Having noted several factors which the Court does consider,
it would now seem appropriate to mention that there are some
factors which the Court refuses to consider in arriving at a deter-
mination on a question of probable cause. First of all, in United
States v. Di Re 36 the Court refused to consider the fact that the de-
fendant had submitted to arrest without an argument or resistance.
The opinion stated that "probable cause cannot be found from
submissiveness, and the presumption of innocence is not lost or
impaired by neglect to argue with a policeman.137 The Court's
refusal to consider this factor seems somewhat inconsistent with
the general rule in the determination of probable cause, stated
in the following words:
But the general constitutional standard . require[s] only that
there be reasonable belief of guilt. This is not so high a standard
as to preclude arrest where an innocent construction of the acts
of the defendant is possible.38
Most factors are treated as subject to consideration even
though they are perfectly consistent with an innocent interpre-
tation, and it is not entirely clear why the non-protest factor should
be treated differently. Generally, the innocent interpretation goes
only to weight and not to admissibility, so to speak, but here the
interpretation seems to rule out the factor from consideration
33 Id. at 210.
34 The National Prohibition Act § 25, 41 Stat. 305, 27 U.S.C. § 39, authorized
the issuance of warrants to search for intoxicating liquors as provided in Title XI
of the Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 228.
3 The original warrant had been issued on July sixth and the statute provided
that any warrant not executed within ten days of issuance was void. Since the first
warrant was not executed within ten days it was re-issued, but the Court held that
the statute did not provide for re-issuance and, therefore, that it must be a new
vrarrant and that no probable cause existed for issuance of a warrant on July twenty-
seventh because of the time lapse.
30 332 U.S. 581 (1947).
37 Id. at 595.
38 United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1951).
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entirely. Perhaps this treatment is consistent with the more fre-
quently stated rule that the fourth amendment and legislation
regulating the criminal process should be liberally construed in
favor of the individual. 9
An analogous situation to this treatment of the non-protest
factor is the Supreme Court's treatment of a suspect's furtive
gestures when such gestures are provoked by the unlawful conduct
of the arresting officer. Perhaps the Court's refusal to consider the
non-protest factor is explained by the same reasons which lead the
Court to decline consideration of such furtive gestures-that this
represents the reaction of a normal citizen and does not necessarily
arise from a sense of guilt. A more complete discussion of the furtive
gesture factor is set out below. Suffice it to say at this point that the
Supreme Court, in the absence of provoking conduct by the officer,
does consider such factors in reaching a determination on questions
of probable cause, although the weight given them is slight.
Good Faith.
The good faith of the arresting officers, it would seem, should
be of no relevance in a determination of probable cause. Whether
the standard of probable cause is met should be a determination
made by a judicial officer based on the facts known to the officers,
not on the officers' feeling. Although the Court has not completely
ignored this factor, it has accorded it very little weight.40
Before looking to see what the Supreme Court has done with
the general ideas in the area of probable cause, it must be kept in
mind that the time at which probable cause must exist is before
the search or arrest: fourth-amendment protection extends to the
innocent and guilty alike41 and the fact that the defendant is
caught "red-handed" does not cleanse or justify a search made
without probable cause.42 In the same vein, the Supreme Court
has also held that where a warrant is sought, whether or not it was
issued on probable cause depends on the statements made in the
affidavits in support thereof and, if the affidavits state only the
affiant's belief without the facts on which belief is based, no probable
cause is stated.43
39 See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1947) ; United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40 Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923) ; Henry v. United States,
supra note 22.
41 See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; Byars v. United States, supra note 39.
42 United States v. Di Re, supra note 27.
43 Jones v. United States, supra note 19; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S.
41 (1933); Byars v. United States, supra note 39.
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III. THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Quantum Fluctuation: Gravity of the Offense
To assert that the standard of probable cause necessary to
validate a search or arrest should fluctuate with the seriousness of
the offense involved would seem to be a very tenable position. Such
a position is supported by the Restatement of Torts,44 which lists
the seriousness of the offense as a factor to be considered in deter-
mining the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. The argument in
favor of this position is well stated as follows:
Even under a probable cause to obtain a warrant test, the lawful-
ness of any given warrantless arrest should depend on the totality
of circumstances, and it is a mistake ever to hold that the Fourth
Amendment has no room for such obviously relevant factors as
... the seriousness or violent or non-violent nature of the offense
for which the arrest is made.4 5
However, the authority for such a position is at best shaky. The
only supporter of such a position ever to sit on the Supreme
Court seems to have been Mr. Justice Jackson. And in the two
instances when he expressed his views in this regard he was forced
to do so in a dissenting and concurring opinion. Dissenting in
Brinegar v. United States,48 and objecting to what he felt was a
blanket authority to search automobiles on mere suspicion, he said:
But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amend-
ment for these reasons, [referring to the special problems pre-
sented law enforcement agencies by the use of the automobile]
it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of
the offense.47
He then went on to suggest that a search of every car on the road,
if conducted fairly and in good faith, might be justified without
probable cause if a kidnapping were involved and random search
was the only way to save the child's life and detect the vicious
criminals. But he would not have sustained the same roadblock to
catch a bootlegger even if it were the only way. In his concurring
opinion in McDonald v. United States48 he suggests that the Court
in practice actually does recognize such a fluctuating standard when
he says:
44 Restatement, Torts § 119, comment j (1934).
45 Broeder, 'Wong Sun v. United States: A Study In Faith And Hope," 42
Neb. L. Rev. 483, 515 (1962).
46 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
47 Id. at 183.
48 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting
to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity
of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it .... While I should be human
enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to
officers acting to deal with threats or crimes of violence which
endanger life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of
crime. Almost without exception, the overzeal was in suppressing
acts not malmn in se but only nalum prohibitum.4 9
Although Mr. Justice Jackson may have been correct in his analysis
of the cases and the types of crimes involved in those where the
search was found unlawful, the Court has never recognized that
the standard differs with the type of crime involved. Perhaps the
Court's refusal to make such a recognition arises from a fear that
to do so would be to add too great a subjective factor to an already
highly subjective area. In any event, it seems safe to say at this
point that the Court will not look with favor on an argument that
a diminished probable cause requirement should exist in a given
case due to the seriousness of the offense involved. I would be
inclined to think that the Court would answer such an argument
with language similar to the following:
The damnable character of the ... business should not close our
eyes to the mischief which will surely follow any attempt to
destroy it by unwarranted methods. 'To press forward to a great
principle by breaking through every other great principle that
stands in the way of its establishment; ... in short, to procure
an eminent good by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant
to private morality as to public justice.' 50
Quantum Fluctuation: Arrest Without A Warrant
From time to time it has been suggested that a less stringent
standard of probable cause is applied in justifying a warrantless
arrest than is applied in justifying the issuance of a warrant.5 '
However, a study of four Supreme Court cases decided within the
last seven years convinces one that just the opposite is the case.
In Mallory v. United States 52 the Court explicitly states that
police officers may arrest only on probable cause-not on mere
49 Id. at 459-60.
50 Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
163 (1925).
51 See, e.g., Barrett, "Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or
Charge," 50 Calif. L. Rev. 11, 20 (1962); Collings, "Toward Workable Rules of
Search and Seizure-An Amicus Curiae Brief," 50 Calif. L. Rev. 421 (1962).
52 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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suspicion-and goes on to state that officers cannot arrest and inter-
rogate in order to determine whom they should charge before a
committing magistrate on probable cause. The Court refers to
these two distinct times when probable cause is required-at the
time of arrest and at the time of committment-in the same
breath,5 3 without making any distinction as to the weight of facts
necessary to meet the requirement at the two different times.
However, if the above case were not enough to settle the
question, it should have been permanently put to rest in 1960 in
Jones v. United States.5 4 In that case, which involved the execution
of a search warrant for narcotics, the Court upheld the warrant
as having been issued on probable cause and in doing so cited
Draper v. United States55 for the proposition that the facts before
the magistrate did constitute probable cause. Draper involved a
warrantless arrest and consequently its citation in Jones indicated
that the Court was equating the standard to be applied in the two
situations. Furthermore the language of the Court in Jones further
substantiates that proposition.
If evidence of a more judicially competent or persuasive character
than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without
a warrant must be presented when a warrant is sought, warrants
could seldom legitimatize police conduct, and resort to them would
ultimately be discouraged. Due regard for the safeguard govern-
ing arrests and searches counsels the contrary. In a doubtful case,
when the officer does not have clearly convincing evidence of the
immediate need to search, it is most important that resort be had
to a warrant, so that the evidence in the possession of the police
may be weighed by an independent judicial officer, whose decision,
not that of the police, may govern whether liberty or privacy is to
be invaded.';
Finally, in Wong Sun v. United States,7 the Court definitely
stated that the standard of probable cause necessary to arrest with-
out a warrant is at least as stringent as that required for the
issuance of a warrant and then went one step further to suggest
that the standard in the former situation may, in fact, be more
stringent. The Court said:
Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity
of the information on which an officer may act are more stringent
53 Id. at 456.
54 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
t5 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
56 Supra note 54, at 270-71.
57 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less
stringent than where an arrest warrant is obtained.5'
Quantum Fluctuation: Federalism
Now that Mapp v. Okio5l9 has extended the exclusionary rule
to the states, there is some suggestion that the Court is relaxing
the standard of probable cause so as to invalidate fewer state
arrests and searches. The theory is that the capabilities of different
local law enforcement agencies differ and that the federal standard
may prove too stringent. That is, it is feared that the federal
standard might prove too great a hindrance to efficient law enforce-
ment on the local level.
A lowering of the standard of probable cause may in fact
have occurred, but it did not result from the extension of the
exclusionary rule to the states. If the standard was lowered, it
began with and had its greatest advance two years before the
Mapp case in Draper v. United States.60 In that case an informer,
who was paid small sums of money by the Bureau of Narcotics
and who had given accurate and reliable information in the past,
informed a special narcotics agent that Draper was peddling
narcotics from his abode. Four days later the same informer for-
warded information that Draper had gone to Chicago by train and
would bring back to Denver three ounces of heroin. He also said
that Draper would return from Chicago on either the eighth or
ninth of September on the morning train from Chicago and gave a
complete physical description of Draper. Finally, he said that
Draper would be carrying a tan zipper-bag and habitually walked
quite fast. The agents stationed themselves at the train station
and on the second morning they saw a man who fit the informer's
description perfectly get off the train from Chicago and quickly
walk toward the exit gate with a tan zipper-bag in hand. They
arrested and searched him and found two envelopes of heroin and
a syringe. The Court held that probable cause existed for the
arrest. The Court relied upon the fact that, except for whether
Draper had accomplished his mission, every fact of the hearsay
information given by the informer had been verified or corroborated
at the time of the arrest. The Court seemed to ignore the fact that
whether Draper had committed a crime rested on the question of
whether or not he had accomplished his mission. Had he not so
accomplished his mission, all the other corroborated information
would have been irrelevant regardless of its accuracy.
58 Id. at 479.
59 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
60 Supra note 55.
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When Draper is compared with Henry v. United States6' and
Giordenello v. United States 2 there appears to be an inconsistency
-the standard of probable cause seems to have diminished. To a
substantial degree this appearance is accurate. In both the latter
cases, the arresting officers had received information implicating the
ultimate defendants and had put them under surveillance. In
Giordenelo a warrant was procured on the basis of this information
and in Henry there was no warrant. In both cases the officers
followed the respective defendants and arrested them after observ-
ing what they felt was suspicious conduct. The Court refused to
find probable cause in either case and struck down both arrests
and searches mainly on the basis that the officers had no personal
knowledge of any crime being committed and that no facts were
set out from which such personal knowledge could be drawn. That
is, the facts, if any, on which the informers based their belief were
not set out. In addition there were no facts on which the officers
could base such a belief. This personal knowledge requirement was
also absent in Draper. The officers had no personal knowledge of
any facts which could have led to the conclusion that Draper was
a narcotics supplier, and there is no indication that the facts on
which the informer based his belief were communicated to either the
officers or the court. Since Draper came before Henry in point of
time and since Henry seems to be out of the same mold as Giorde-
nello, it cannot be said that Draper dispensed with the personal
knowledge requirement. Neither can it be said, as some have con-
tended, 3 that the Court in Draper found personal knowledge,
though on extremely tenuous facts. Rather, it must be said that
the Court distinguished Draper and substituted the corroboration
of the informer's story in place of the personal knowledge require-
ment. It is true and must be recognized that there was a substantial
amount of corroboration in Draper which did not exist in either
of these other cases. Another distinguishing factor is that in Draper
the identity of the informer, his position or relationship with the
Bureau of Narcotics, and the facts which led the officers to act
were fully revealed to the court; in Henry and Giordenello these
facts never were fully revealed. This factor may have had an effect
on the outcome in these cases.
Two other cases relating to the determination of whether or
not probable cause is being diluted are Ker v. United States 64 and
61 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
02 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
13 See, e.g., 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 661 (1960).
64 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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United States v. Rugendorf.65 Those who feel that the Supreme
Court is relaxing the standard since Mapp "I cite the Ker case as
establishing that position. In Ker a state officer posing as a buyer
of narcotics negotiated a deal with a known seller. They went to-
gether to a bowling alley to meet the seller's contact and the officer
waited in the car. The seller came out shortly and pointed out a
1956 DeSoto as his connection's car saying they were to meet him
"up by the oil field" where he kept his supply. As they neared that
location the officer saw the DeSoto again. They parked and soon
the DeSoto pulled up beside them. The officer recognized the driver
from a "mug shot" as one Murphy, a large-scale dope peddler then
free on bail. The officer waited While his seller and Murphy went
up into the hills. They returned in a short time with a package of
marijuana which was later cut at the seller's house. The officer took
what he had received and reported back to two other officers, one
of whom had observed the above occurrences. The next day Murphy
was put under surveillance and the officers, after losing him in
traffic, went to the oil field to wait. Parked across the street from
them was Ker. Murphy drove past and soon returned to park
behind Ker. He walked up to Ker's car as the officers watched
through glasses from one thousand feet away. It was too dark for
them to tell if anything was passed between Murphy and Ker, but
they drove by and got Ker's license number plus a good look at his
face. When Ker left, the officers tried to follow him but lost him
when he made a U-turn in the middle of the road. They then got
Ker's name and address by checking his license. They communi-
cated all of the above facts to officer Berman who had received
information in the past from a reliable informer that Ker was selling
marijuana in his apartment and was getting it from a Murphy.
On this combination of facts the officers went to Ker's apartment,
got a pass key, entered, arrested the defendant, and seized the
marijuana they found. 7
A comparison of the facts in Ker with those in Draper leads
to the conclusion that the officers in Ker had at least as much, if
not more, cause to believe that the defendant was committing a
felony as they did in Draper. In Ker the corroboration of the
informer's story went to the fact that the crime was being com-
mitted as reported, not merely to the informer's reliability as in
65 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
66 Supra note 59.
67 On entering the apartment the officers immediately saw a block of marijuana
in plain sight, but this does not concern us here, because the arrest obviously occurred
with the opening of the door. Neither are we concerned with the question of the
legality of the manner of entry because that does not affect the question of probable
cause.
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Draper. Consequently, this writer asserts that the case for the state
in Ker was much stronger than in Draper, and therefore, Ker
represents no relaxation of the standard of probable cause from a
Draper standpoint.
The Ker case also compares favorably with the line of cases
represented by Giordenello and Henry. The officers in Ker had
considerable personal knowledge which led to their belief that the
defendant was committing an offense. They had been in the same
place at the oil field the night before when Murphy had delivered
marijuana to one of them. There was little reason to frequent the
area due to its remoteness, but Murphy did return to the same spot
at the same time when he met Ker. Under these circumstances, the
officers, in using their normal reasoning facilities, 6 could come to
but one conclusion. Under any test of probable cause these facts
should qualify.
On the other hand, the Rugendorf case, considered with Draper,
does offer some support for the proposition that the standard of
probable cause is being relaxed. In that case the affiant officer swore
that a reliable informer had reported to affiant that he had seen
eighty furs in the defendant's basement and that he had been told
they were stolen furs. The affidavit pointed out the informer's de-
tailed description of the furs and that the affiant had checked the
records of fur thefts and found only one recent theft in which the
furs taken matched the description given by the informer. Finally,
affiant swore that a reliable informant had informed him that the
defendant's brother was a fence for professional burglars. The
corroboration here, unlike that in Draper, did go to the commission
of the crime and not merely to the reliability of the informer. But
in spite of this the corroboration in Rugendorf seems very weak;
therefore, the argument is persuasive that this case represents a
second step toward a relaxing of the standard of probable cause.
In fact, it seems quite likely that the defendant would have pre-
vailed on the question of probable cause in Rugendorf had not the
affidavit in support of the warrant been so complete. The affidavit
contained a complete statement of the experience which led the
informer to believe that the crime had been committed. Thus the
personal knowledge requirement of Henry was met even though the
personal knowledge belonged to the informer and not to the officer.
This may have been the deciding factor in the case.
There is still another reason why it seems that the standard
of probable cause is being relaxed. In the Ker case and more
68 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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significantly in Rugendorf, there were dissenting opinions; 69 and yet
in neither case did the dissenters mention the issue of probable
cause. They assumed that the requirement had been met. From
this it seems arguable that even those members of the Court who
have in the past favored a stringent standard may have become
willing to moderate their views in favor of more efficient law
enforcement.
IV. EVIDENCE REQUIRED To ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
Hearsay: Suficiency and Corroboration
It is obvious from a reading of the Draper"° case that hearsay
information may be enough in and of itself if properly corroborated.
However, the more meaningful questions would seem to be, how
much and what corroboration is required?
On first reading, Draper seems to say merely that if hearsay
is corroborated it may be considered as one factor in tending to
establish probable cause but that in itself it does not establish prob-
able cause. However, the only thing the officers in Draper had before
them which tended to prove that Draper was committing an offense
was the informer's statement. Everything else tended only to
demonstrate the informer's reliability and not that a crime was
being committed. Consequently, it must be said -that in Draper
bare hearsay evidence of a crime and an overwhelming amount of
evidence of the informant's reliability was enough.
In the Rugendorf7l case, the corroborating evidence was less
voluminous, but what there was went to the commission of the
crime. That is, the officers had not only the informer's hearsay
statements but also the officer's findings from checking the records,
both sources of information tending to indicate the commission
of the crime. In the Ker7- case the corroboration also tended to
prove the commission of the crime and not the reliability of the
informer, but that case would seem not to be a pivotal one any-
more, because Rugendorf involves the same pattern in terms of cor-
roboration of hearsay and it seems to require much less along those
lines than does Ker.
The conclusion then must be that the degree of corroborative
evidence necessary to make hearsay sufficient in itself to establish
probable cause depends on what the corroborative evidence tends
69 In Riugendorf, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion and was
joined by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Goldberg; In Ker,
the same four dissented with Mr. Justice Brennan writing the opinion.
70 Supra note 55.
71 Supra note 65.
72 Supra note 64.
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to prove. It must be assumed from past cases and from the vigorous
dissent in Draper that the holding there represents an outer limit
in a borderline case. Consequently, it is likely that where the cor-
roborative evidence tends to prove only the informer's reliability,
probable cause will be found only where the amount or volume
of such corroborative evidence is overwhelming. However, on the
basis of Rugendorf it is only fair to assume that if the corroborative
evidence tends to prove the accuracy of the hearsay statement,
much less corroborative evidence, in terms of volume, will be re-
quired for the establishment of probable cause. This assumption is
likely to prove accurate especially if the officers are completely
honest with the court and lay before it their entire file, being
careful to include therein the informer's experience and all of his
personal knowledge which led him to believe the information he
gave the law enforcement agency.
Hearsay: The Reliable Informer In The Lower Federal Courts
The next question to be considered is to what extent the
lower federal courts, in light of Draper, have found reliability of
the informer, in and of itself, to be sufficient corroboration for
probable cause. In this regard, it must be remembered that in
Draper there was both a record of past reliability and corroboration
of present reliability. Also of significance is Jones v. United States,7 '
where probable cause for the issuance of a warrant was found on
the basis of a record of past reliable information from the informant
together with information from other sources which corroborated
wer courts following Draper, almost without exception,
result that no corroboration is necessary to establish
:ause if the informer is shown to be reliable. However,
nsiderably beyond the Draper facts in finding reliability
o excuse the need for evidence corroborative of the crime
reas in Draper there was evidence of both past reliability
it reliability, the lower courts will find that probable -
been established, without the presentation of evidence
ive of the crime itself, if evidence of past reliability or
F present reliability exists. They do not require evidence
short, a review of the lower court cases indicates (a) if
rroborative of present reliability is presented, probable
be found regardless of the lack of evidence corroborative
.e itself and the lack of a record of past reliability,74 (b)
S. 257 (1960).
v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hawkidn& v. United -.
?d 537 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Castle v. United States, 287 F2d 657 (5th Cir.
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a record of past reliability alone is generally not a sufficient basis
on which to establish probable cause,75 but if the information
comes from a paid informer or one employed for the purpose of
uncovering such information the past record alone may suffice, 76
and (c) if there is a record of past reliability -and evidence of present
reliability, probable cause has been established.T
A brief look at several lower federal court cases may clarify
the above analysis. In Rodgers v. United States78 customs officers
on the California-Mexico border stopped two men returning from
Mexico. After extensive interrogation, one of them admitted that
they had purchased heroin in Mexico and stated that the defendant
-the other man's wife-was bringing it back into the United
States on foot. He stated that she could be found in the San Diego
bus station and would be carrying the heroin. He indicated that
he had previously worked as an informer with federal narcotics
agents in the San Francisco area, but the customs agents were
unable to confirm this; consequently, they had no basis for believing
that he had a record of reliability as an informer. Nevertheless,
they proceeded to the bus station and arrested the defendant after
the informer pointed her out. The heroin was discovered on her
person at the police station, and she was subsequently convicted.
In the final analysis, the officers had no evidence of past reliability,
and the only evidence of present reliability was that the defendant
was found where the informer said she would be, not where her
husband said she was, and that the car in which the men were
riding had several suitcases in the trunk, indicating that defendant's
husband was lying when he said they had been in Mexico only for
the day. Nevertheless, the court found that probable cause had
been established by the limited amount of evidence of present
reliability alone.
Another example of reliance on present reliability alone is
McDermott v. Joln Bawmgortl. Co.,7 9 where the court issued and
1961) ; McDermott v. John Baumgorth Co., 286 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Rodgers
v. United States, 267 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1959); United States ex rel Campbell v.
Rundle, 216 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1963); United States v. Vasquez, 183 F. Supp.
190 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
75 Price v. United States, 262 F2d 684 (10th Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Blitz,
199 F.Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
76 DiBella v. United States, 284 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1960) (dissent); United
States v. Ramirez, 279 F2d 712 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d
781 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Butler v. United States, 273 F2d 436 (9th Cir. 1959).
7T United States v. Prince, 301 F2d 358 (6th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. One
1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 265 F2d 21 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Jordan, 216 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ill. 1963) ; United States v. Casanova, 213 F. Supp.
654 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
78 267 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1959).
79 286 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961).
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enforced a summons on grounds of suspected fraudulent tax returns
of a corporation. s0 The only evidence was the tip of a former vice
president of the corporation, the present reliability of which was
corroborated by a similar tip from a former accountant. Neither
individual had ever been an informant, but the court found that
probable cause was established.
Butler v. United States"' exemplifies the line of cases holding
that past reliability alone is a sufficient basis for the establishment
of probable cause when the informer is paid or is employed for
that purpose. In that case narcotics agents obtained entrance into
defendant's apartment by ruse and arrested and searched him
strictly on the basis of a tip from a paid informer who had been
reliable in the past. There was nothing which in any way sub-
stantiated the information of the informer or even his present
reliability, but the court found probable cause had been established.
The court emphasized the fact that in Draper the Supreme Court
had noted that the informer was employed for the purpose of
uncovering information.
Also worthy of mention is the fact that in corroborating an
informer's tip through the use of facts which indicate his present
reliability, the existence of two or more informers is helpful. The
courts rely on the Jones82 case in holding that two informers giving
the same information tend to corroborate each other.83 Conse-
quently, it is possible to have no evidence other than the tips of
two informers and to have a court find that probable cause has
been established through the corroboration of the hearsay state-
ments by the informer's present reliability.
Where the informer is of unknown identity or reliability the
courts are generally unwilling to find that probable cause has been
established unless corroborating evidence of the crime itself is
presented. 4 In Wong Sun v. United Statess" the Supreme Court
was confronted with a case of an informer of unproven reliability.
There was a disagreement between the majority and dissenting
80 In this case the court held that in ordering the enforcement of a summons
the district court should apply the same test that it would apply in deciding whether
an arrest by an officer without a warrant complied with constitutional and statutory
requirements.
81 273 F2d 436 (9th Cir. 1959).
82 Supra note 73.
83 United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, supra note 77;
McDermott v. John Baumgorth Co., supra note 74; Hawkins v. United States, supra
note 74; United States v. Rundle, supra note 74; United States v. Murphy, 174 F.
Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1959).
84 Cochran v. United States, 291 F2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961); Contee v. United
States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Contra, United States v. Copes, 191 F. Supp.
623 (D. Md. 1961).
85 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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opinions over the question of how specific the informer's information
was, but there is no dispute over the fact that his reliability was
not proved by past performance. Furthermore, according to the
majority opinion, the informer's information was not sufficiently
accurate to lead the officers directly to the suspect. Therefore, his
past reliability was not corroborated and his present reliability
was not subject to corroboration because the information given
was not specific enough. Whether or not the Court would have
found probable cause solely on corroboration of present reliability,
as some of the lower federal courts have done, is debatable; but
since neither past nor present reliability was corroborated and since
no other evidence indicated guilt, the Court found probable cause
to be lacking.88
Hearsay: Thze Officer as Hearsay Declarant
The lower courts seem to be unanimous in holding that where
an officer receives information through some mode of communi-
cation from another officer in a different part of the country, he
may rely on it for an arrest and search of the person implicated.
This would seem to be reasonable if the forwarding officer himself
had probable cause for such an arrest. The well reasoned cases
include a proviso to this effect in their opinions. They provide that
the arresting officer need not have probable cause if his source of
information (another officer) did, but that the arresting officer
who relies on the summary assertions of the other officer can
acquire therefrom no greater authority than could have been exer-
cised by the latter if he had been the arresting officer.87 In addition,
86 Wong Sun raises an interesting question whether reliability should be accorded
the word of an informer who is a prisoner, absent a past record of reliability. The
majority in Wong Sun did not feel that this would be wise, but the dissent favored
the adoption of such a rule. The dissent reasoned that the informer should have been
presumed reliable, thus corroborating his statement and establishing probable cause,
because the information he gave tended to implicate him in a crime and was thus a
declaration against interest. The dissent also pointed out that a prisoner who is
confronted with prosecution is likely to give reliable information because he knows
that his story will be checked and that discrepancies in it may go hard with him.
This is an interesting theory and will no doubt be pressed by the government in the
future since it has now been considered in the Supreme Court. Already one case,
Williams v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), has adopted the theory
in the process of distinguishing Wong Sui. In Williams the informer had confessed
and had informed narcotics agents that his supplier was due in about an hour. The
agents waited and arrested defendant when he arrived. The court stated, "Williams
had confessed and was obviously attempting to curry favor with his captors. It
would be ignoring reality to suppose that Williams would have deliberately misled
the agents who could and did verify his statement in a relatively short time after it
was given." Id. at 673.
87 United States v. McCormick, 309 F2d 367 (7th Cir. 1962); United States
v. Bianco, 189 F2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951).
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there is authority in the lower courts for the position that if the
information is communicated to the arresting officer through an
official source he may rely on the information and arrest in accord-
ance with it even though the source is unknown to him.8 In other
words the official nature of the mode of communication is sufficient
corroboration to establish probable cause without any knowledge
of the source. This of course leaves open the question of what
happens if the source of the information was without sufficient
knowledge to constitute probable cause.
Initially these cases may appear harsh, but it must be recog-
nized that any other approach would play havoc with all semblance
of efficient law enforcement; therefore, they must be accepted.
The courts, however, should not allow themselves to slip into a
position where the use of modem communication isolates the police
officer from continued scrutiny under the fourth amendment.
Observation: Furtive Gestures
A furtive gesture is defined as an action on the part of a
suspect, in the presence of law enforcement officers, which leads
them to believe or solidifies their belief that he is guilty of a given
offense. Since all such gestures are generally subject to possible
innocent interpretations, the question arises as to whether such
gestures are relevant in establishing probable cause. The imaginable
number of furtive gestures is infinite, but the most common action
on the part of a suspect which the government feels should be
relevant in the establishment of probable cause is flight.
A study of the pertinent Supreme Court cases leads to the
conclusion that the display of a furtive gesture by a suspect prior
to his arrest is generally relevant to the issue of whether or not
probable cause for arrest existed. However, the weight accorded
such a factor by the Court has been minimal. The fact that the
Court does consider such factors relevant is best indicated by the
language of Henry v. United States,9 a case not involving a furtive
gesture, where the Court, speaking of defendants' actions and
finding no probable cause, said, "Riding in the car, stopping in an
alley, picking up packages, driving away-these were all acts that
are outwardly innocent. Their movements in the car had no mark
of fleeing men or men acting furtively." 90 This language indicates
that the Court would consider relevant any action by a defendant
which did have the mark of a fleeing man or a man acting furtively.
88 United States v. Juvelis, 194 F. Supp. 745 (D.NJ. 1961).
89 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
90 Id. at 103. (Emphasis added.)
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Husty v. United States"' and Brinegar v. United States92 are
further evidence that the Court does consider furtive gestures
relevant. In Husty the Court explicitly cites the flight of defendant's
companions on the approach of the officers as one of the factors
which led to the establishment of probable cause for defendant's
arrest and the search of his automobile. In Brinegar, where the
defendant was apprehended only after a lengthy chase down an
open highway, the Court found that probable cause was established
where the arresting officer had substantial ground for believing
that the defendant was engaged in an illegal activity and the
circumstances under which the arrest was made were not such as
to indicate the suspect was going about legitimate affairs. How-
ever, the weight accorded the flight in these cases was not sub-
stantial. In fact, in Husty there is little doubt that the Court
would have found probable cause even if there had been no flight,
and in Brinegar the Court did find that probable cause existed
before the flight commenced.
In addition, there are two Supreme Court cases, Miller v.
United States9 3 and Wong Sun v. United States,94 which refuse to
consider the flight of the defendant as relevant. In both of these
cases the defendant slammed the door of his home in the arresting
officers' faces and fled. In both instances the Court found that
flight was not relevant in that it did not tend to prove guilt or
establish probable cause. However, this approach by the Court is
explained by the fact that in both cases the officers' manner of
entry was unlawful. That is, in Miller the officers knocked on the
defendant's door and when he inquired as to their identity they
merely whispered "Police" so that he could not hear them. As a
result, defendant opened the door without receiving from the police
notice of their purpose and authority, as required by law. 5 Likewise,
in Wong Sun the officer misrepresented his reason for being there
and thus induced the defendant to open the door without giving
him notice of purpose and authority. The Court in both cases felt
that the unlawful manner of entry by the officers rendered the
defendant's flight irrelevant simply because such flight might have
been provoked by the officer's conduct, not necessarily by defend-
ant's sense of guilt; and was, therefore, ambiguous. In short, the
Court felt that the conduct of the officers had a tendency to cause
even the normal citizen to act in a furtive manner and that, there-
91 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
92 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
93 357 U.S. 301 (1957).
90 Supra note 57.
95 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958).
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fore, the defendants' gestures were more susceptible to an innocent
interpretation than a guilty one. The fact that these cases involved
the invasion of the defendants' privacy in their homes rather than
merely their automobiles was even more reason to believe that
their reactions were those of normal citizens and did not necessarily
indicate a sense of guilt.
From these cases it seems fair to say that the Supreme Court
feels that furtive gestures are relevant to establish probable cause,
except where those gestures are provoked by the unlawful conduct
of the arresting officer, but that the weight given to them will not
be great. The failure to accord much weight to furtive gestures
was continued in Ker v. California."' The Court barely mentioned
the defendant's U-turn which thwarted the officers' attempt to
follow him from the scene of the crime. Once again, there was
sufficient evidence independent of this gesture to establish probable
cause.
In general, the lower federal courts seem to pay more attention
to furtive gestures than does the Supreme Court. For instance,
cases can be found where furtive gestures have been crucial in a
court's finding that probable cause has been established. The use of
a devious route through the back streets of a city after crossing
the border,97 a meeting in a secluded area on a bootleggers' route
in the early hours of the morning,9" the act of putting a hand to
the mouth as narcotics agents approach, 99 the act of adjusting
clothing beside a car in an area where a woman's screams have just
been reported, 00 and the abnormal and obnoxious manner of a
woman riding in a car with one who has just been implicated in
the narcotics racket by an informer"1 have played a deciding role
in different courts' determinations of probable cause.
Even though the lower courts often consider furtive gestures,
such gestures alone usually will not be enough to establish probable
cause. Probable cause must exist independently of the gestures. This
is particularly true of flight. When flight is the gesture involved,
the courts seem to follow the cue of the Supreme Court and refuse
to accord much weight to fleeing itself.102 The courts mention
96 Supra note 64.
97 Lane v. United States, 321 F2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963).
98 United States v. Copes, supra note 87.
99 Espinoza v. United States, 278 F2d 802 (5th Cir. 1960).
100 Ralph v. Pepersack, 218 F. Supp. 932 (D. Md. 1963).
101 United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wis.
1963).
102 Carter v. United States, 314 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Taglavore v. United
States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508
(D.Mass. 1963).
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flight in cases where probable cause exists independently, but in-
variably fail to allow it to carry the load when the other factors
can not establish probable cause.0 3 The attitude of courts with
respect to flight is well illustrated by a recent court of appeals
case from the District of Columbia.'0 4 In this case, the court goes
to extraordinary length in analyzing the many possible innocent
interpretations of flight; in the process numerous psychological
treatises which deal with man's reaction to police officers without
regard to innocence or guilt are cited.
As pointed out above, there are cases that accord more weight
to various other types of furtive gestures, but there are also cases
which refute this approach and take the more restrictive view with
respect to those same gestures. For instance, there are cases that
have held the act of putting a hand to the mouth and fleeing at the
approach of a narcotics agent0 5 or turning down a side street to
avoid an awaiting police car' ° or the execution of two U-turns com-
bined with other suspicious driving after crossing the border' 0 T
was insufficient to establish probable cause even when the officers
had what seemed to be substantial grounds for suspicion prior to
the gestures. Obviously the courts are not in complete agreement
on the weight to be given furtive gestures; and since the gestures
differ in each case, such agreement is probably impossible. It gen-
erally appears that the lower federal courts take the same con-
servative approach in this area that the Supreme Court does.
A factor related to furtive gestures which occasionally presents
itself for consideration in the establishment of probable cause is
the defendant's inability to explain his presence at a place where
his presence throws suspicion on him. The real problem here is the
timing of the arrest. If it took place before the defendant's inability
to explain his presence became apparent, then such inability could
not be considered in determining whether or not there was probable
cause for the arrest.
Like the furtive gesture factor, the defendant's lack of an
explanation is probably not accorded great weight; and if this is
the only reason for the officer's belief of guilt it will not constitute
probable cause.08 But, if the defendant's unexplained presence is
103 Monnette v. United States, 299 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Bruner v. United
States, 293 F2d 621 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Williams, 219 F. Supp. 666
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v. Sala, 209 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Pa. 1962) ; United
States v. O'Leary, 201 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); United States v. Murphy,
174 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1959).
104 Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
105 Taglavore v. United States, supra note 102.
106 Price v. United States, 262 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1959).
107 Plazola v. United States, 291 F2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961).
108 Ortiz v. United States, 317 F2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963).
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added to other factors which would seem to indicate his guilt, this
one factor might be just what the government needs for a showing
of probable cause.109
V. PROCEDURE To ATTACK PROBABLE CAUSE
The Burden of Proof
The procedural manner of attack employed by a defendant
against what he deems a warrantless search or arrest without
probable cause or a search warrant issued on something less than
probable cause is a motion to suppress under Rule 41(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The purpose of such a motion
is to prevent the use of any evidence discovered by law enforcement
officials during the course of an unreasonable search. Ordinarily,
the success of such a motion dooms the prosecution to failure since
the case against the defendant often turns upon the evidence un-
covered by the search. Consequently, which party bears the burden
of proof on the motion to suppress is a crucial factor.
The Supreme Court has never been squarely confronted with
the question of which party has the burden of proof on a motion
to suppress for lack of probable cause. Two Supreme Court cases
indicate how the Court would hold and how the lower courts have
held. In Brinegar v. United States,"0 a case involving a search
without a warrant, the Court did not expressly hold that the gov-
ernment had the burden of proof, but in speaking of difference in
degrees of proof necessary to establish guilt and probable cause,
the Court assumed that the burden of proving both lies on the
government. In Jones v. United States,"' a case involving a search
with a warrant, the Court indicated that the party challenging
the validity of the search should bear the burden of establishing
its invalidity. It is true that the Court was dealing primarily with
a question of standing, but there also was a question of probable
cause involved in the case.
Since a motion to suppress may be based upon any point which
the defendant feels may render the search unreasonable, the vast
majority of the cases which discuss the burden of proof state the
general rule that the burden of proof is on the movant. A quick
reading of the cases, therefore, gives the impression that this is the
rule on burden of proof with respect to all motions to suppress.
A close reading of this group of cases in which the motion to
suppress is based upon an alleged lack of probable cause indicates
109 United States v. Zimple, 318 F2d 676 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Ralph v. Pepersack,
supra note 100.
110 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
111 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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that this rule does not apply absolutely."' Rather, the distinction
between warrantless searches and searches with a warrant drawn
by the two Supreme Court cases cited above is adopted and applied
by the lower federal courts. The result is that if the attack is on a
warrantless search and is based on an alleged lack of probable
cause, the burden of proof is on the government to show that there
existed grounds for the officers' good faith belief of probable cause
before the search. If the attack is on a search made with a warrant
and is based on an allegation that the warrant was issued on
something less than probable cause, the burden of proving that
allegation is on the defendant." 3 Fairness demands that this dis-
tinction be drawn and that the government bear the burden of
proof at least in cases of warrantless searches. From a practical
standpoint, it would be impossible for a defendant to prove a lack
of probable cause in the abstract. The defendant cannot be expected
to prove a lack of some item until he knows on what the govern-
ment bases its claim of its existence.
In addition, there are several other exceptions to the general
rule that the movant has the burden of proof on a motion to sup-
press. First of all, the government always has the burden of proving
consent on the part of the defendant by clear and positive evidence
if it seeks to justify the search on that basis.114 Secondly, if the
defendant is successful in establishing that a search was illegal and
that certain items were seized by the government, the burden then
shifts to the government to prove that its evidence has an origin
independent of the illegal search.""
Finally, defendant's counsel must be careful to file any motion
to suppress before the trial. The trial court has discretion to enter-
tain such a motion after the trial has begun, and it is very doubtful
that a judge would refuse to hear such a motion in view of the
criminal nature of the proceedings; but, as a rule, if there is a valid
112 United States v. Rivera, 321 F2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963); Plazola v. United
States, supra note 107; Cervantes v. United States, 278 F2d 350 (9th Cir. 1960);
Wrightson v. United States, 222 F2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
318 Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962); Batten v. United
States, 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. Nagle, 34 F2d 952 (N.D.N.Y.
1929); United States v. Nepela, 28 F.2d 898 (N.D.N.Y. 1928); United States v.
Boscarino, 21 F.2d 575 (W.D.N.Y. 1927); United States v. Goodwin, 1 F.2d 36
(S.D. Cal. 1924).
114 Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; United States v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp.
891 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; United States v. Regina, 200 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. DeVivo, 190 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
115 United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962) ; United States v.
Coplon, 185 F2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519
(E.D.N.Y. 1955).
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objection to a search, it should be raised by motion prior to
the trial.11
Disclosure of Identity of Informers on Motion To Suppress
There are two Supreme Court cases of importance which deal
with the requirement of disclosure in the face of a plea of privilege
on the part of the government.117 The first of these, Roviaro v.
United States,"" is confusing and seems to have given the lower
federal courts trouble in its application. The second, Rugendorf v.
United States,"' is too recent to have created much comment yet.
It appears, however, that this case may further complicate this
legal problem and that it may have greatly reduced a defendant's
chance of forcing disclosure on a motion to suppress for purpose
of testing probable cause.
In Roviaro, two federal narcotics agents were notified by an
informer that he was to make a purchase of narcotics from the de-
fendant at a given time. The agents met the informer on a street
comer and searched both his person and his car, finding no contra-
band. One of the agents then got into the informant's car trunk
while the other followed closely in his car. Soon the defendant
arrived, entered the informant's car, and ordered him to drive
around. During this time the agent in the trunk heard the defendant
instruct the informant to stop and turn off the lights so that they
might "lose a tail" if there had been one. He also heard defendant
question the informant concerning money that the former owed him.
Finally, he heard defendant say that he had brought the informer
"three pieces this time." When the car stopped, the defendant got
out and went to a tree near the road, picked up a package, threw it
into the informant's car, waved to the informant, and walked off to
another car and drove away. This latter sequence of events was seen
by the second agent who had followed the informant's car. The
package contained narcotics; and on learning this, the agents pro-
ceeded to defendant's home and arrested him. Before the trial the
defendant moved for a bill of particulars including a request for the
identity of the informant. 120 In addition, he sought during the trial
116 Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 59 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
117 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; Rugendorf v. United States,
supra note 65.
118 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
110 Supra note 65.
120 The record in this case indicated that the identity of the informant was in
fact known by the defendant and that the informant had died before trial. If either
of these facts were true, the government privilege would not have been applicable,
but the Court refused to assume that either was true since defendant denied knowing
the identity of the informant.
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to question witnesses about the informant's identity, but the trial
court refused to require such disclosure over the government's plea
of privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that disclosure
was required.
Two quotations from the Court's opinion indicate the signifi-
cance of Roviaro on the question of the disclosure requirement as
it affects probable cause. The first of these quotations is properly
noted by some lower courts when dealing with this question, and
it generally leads them to the correct result. Speaking of disclosure,
the Court said:
Most of the federal cases involving this limitation [disclosure]
on the scope of the informer's privilege have arisen where the
legality of a search without a warrant is in issue and the com-
munications of an informer are claimed to establish probable
cause. In these cases the Government has been required to dis-
close the identity of the informant unless there was sufficient
evidence apart from his confidential communication.12 1
This language follows a previous passage which reads:
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents
of his communication is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of the cause, the
privilege must give way.1 22
These passages indicate that disclosure is required if there is not
sufficient corroboration of the information considered independently
of the informant's reliability. That is, no disclosure is required if
there are other facts known by the officers sufficient to corroborate
the information without regard to the informant's reliability, for
the only time the identity of the informer is relevant to the issue
of probable cause is when his reliability or lack of it is determin-
ative of whether the information he gave was sufficiently corrobor-
ated to constitute probable cause. The Court did not, however, base
its holding on this point. Rather, the Court required disclosure
because the informant was the only other witness to the transaction.
The Court reasoned that without the informant's testimony defend-
ant could not refute the agent's testimony or prove his innocence;
therefore, such testimony was essential to a fair trial. The "fair
trial," of course, is a due process question rather than one of
probable cause. In reaching the result in this case, the Court placed
121 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957), citing Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938),
Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932), and United States v. Keown,
19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
122 353 U.S. at 60. (Emphasis added.)
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great emphasis on the direct part the informant had played in the
transaction, the circumstances he had prepared for it, and the
situation which allowed him to hear what took place. This emphasis
is acceptable when the issue presented is whether or not defendant
will obtain a fair trial without disclosure. Disclosure will indicate
the informer was a participant in the transaction, and the knowl-
edge of such a participant may be vital to defendant's cause. When
the question is whether or not an officer had probable cause on
the basis of information to arrest or search, it is totally irrelevant
whether the informant was a participant in the suspected crime.
The question in such a case is not what the informant can testify
to with respect to a possible defense, but whether he is reliable or
not-whether his information was sufficiently corroborated to con-
stitute probable cause. On that issue, whether the informant was
present at the scene of the crime is irrelevant. Consequently, any
lower court handling a request for disclosure for purposes of a
determination on probable cause misconstrues Roviaro if it cites
that case for the proposition that no disclosure will be ordered
unless there has been participation in the transaction by the in-
formant. The proper application of Roviaro in such a case would
seem to be one which requires disclosure unless corroboration of
the informant's tip, sufficient to establish probable cause, existed
independently of the reliability of the informant.
The recent Rugendorf case does not clear up any of the
difficulties in this area. If anything, it will make it more difficult
for a defendant to force disclosure on a motion to suppress. In
this case, the officers acquired a search warrant to search defend-
ant's house on the basis of a tip from an informer that a quantity
of stolen furs was located there. In addition, the affidavit pointed
out that the informant's description of the furs matched the losses
of a recent fur robbery and that defendant's brother was a known
fence for professional burglars. The Court, in affirming the trial
court's refusal to order disclosure, emphasized the information the
officers had in addition to the informant's information which tended
to corroborate this contribution. The Court felt that there was
sufficient corroboration of the hearsay to justify the issuance of the
warrant without disclosure of the informant's identity.123
In any event, the majority points out that the defendant
relied solely upon his motion to suppress as grounds for his need for
disclosure all the way to the court of appeals before he finally
123 In this regard the Court cited the following language from Jones v. United
States, "as hearsay alone does not render an affidavit insufficient, the Commissioner
need not have required the informants ... to be produced . .. so long as there was
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960).
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began asserting that he could not defend properly without the
informant's testimony. The opinion states that he added this
additional ground for disclosure in the court of appeals in an
attempt to bring himself within the Roviaro fact pattern. This
comment by the Court is further indication that the Court does
not regard Roviaro as authority on the question of disclosure where
that question arises in connection with a reliability-probable cause
issue on a motion to suppress. Rather, it indicates that the Court
recognizes Roviaro as precedent on the fair trial-due process issue
of the necessity of the informant's testimony at trial to defend-
ant's defense.
Having so categorized Roviaro, the Court in Rugendorf then
went on to distinguish Roviaro because there was no participation
by the informant in the transaction in the case before the Court.
They held therefore, that disclosure was not required to insure
the defendant a fair trial.
Even the dissenters in Rugendorf did not feel that disclosure
was necessary on the motion to suppress. 12 They based their
dissent on Roviaro and their feeling that the informant's testimony
was necessary at trial to insure the defendant a full opportunity
to present his defense.
In conclusion, Roviaro does not deal directly with the necessity
for disclosure on a motion to suppress for lack of probable cause
although it does indicate that disclosure will be required in such
a case if there is not sufficient evidence apart from the informant's
reliability to corroborate his hearsay statement. This is indicated by
the Court's citation of cases to this effect without disapproval.
Rugendorf, on the other hand, does deal with the problem but
merely holds that in that case there was sufficient evidence inde-
pendent of the informant's reliability to corroborate his tip; there-
fore, disclosure was not required. This seems to leave intact the rule
that disclosure will be required where the existence of probable cause
rests on a hearsay statement of an informer and where such a
statement is corroborated principally by -the asserted reliability of
the informant.
The difficulty experienced by lower federal courts in dealing
with the necessity for disclosure of the informant on a motion to
suppress for lack of probable cause seems to have arisen from one
of two basic mistakes. The first and most prevelant mistake occurs
in cases where an arrest or search is made on the basis of infor-
mation uncorroborated by independent facts which is received from
an informer. In such cases, the courts often refuse to require dis-
closure but at the same time find that probable cause existed,
124 376 U.S. 528, 537 (1964).
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basing their finding of probable cause on Draper.'2 Generally it
is true that the independent corroborating facts in these cases are
as strong as those in Draper. These courts fail to realize, however,
that in Draper the identity of the informer was disclosed, and his
past reliability supplied the Court with additional corroborating
evidence on which to base its findings of probable cause. In light
of the limited corroborating facts, independent of the informant's
past reliability, it is likely that the Supreme Court in Draper would
not have favored probable cause had the defendant possessed the
additional argument that the informer could not have been pre-
sumed reliable since his identity had not been disclosed. Since the
defendant in Draper did not have that argument at hand, reliance
on Draper in a case where there has been no disclosure is not
convincing.
In United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 26
the Alcohol Tax Unit Agents and local police had received several
tips that the defendants were engaged in the illicit liquor business
in a different part of the county. Then on the day of the arrest
they were notified by an informant that the defendants would be
bringing the whiskey into town at a given time in a truck. The
make, model and license number of the truck was also given. On
the basis of this information the officers waited for the defendant's
truck, and when it passed they stopped it. One defendant imme-
diately asserted that the whiskey was not hers; and the officers,
seeing several jugs in the truck, arrested the passengers and searched
the truck. The court refused to compel disclosure but found prob-
able cause after stating that the fact pattern was identical to
that of Draper. It is true that a dispute could arise over the
question when the arrest occurred. If it did not occur until after
the defendant had made her disclaimer of ownership, then per-
haps probable cause did exist without the identity of the informer
to corroborate the information. However, it seems more likely
that the arrest took place when the officers stopped the truck.
Certainly it was their intention to arrest at that time and to
search the truck. If the arrest did take place at that moment,
it is difficult to imagine how probable cause existed without dis-
closure of the informant's identity, for without his reliability as
corroboration, there was little reason to believe defendants were
committing a crime. The officers had even less independent corrobo-
rating fact than existed in Draper. Furthermore, the court indi-
cated that it did not feel that disclosure could ever be justified on
a motion to suppress. The court said, "But we do not think the
125 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
126 265 F2d 21 (10th Cir. 1959).
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identity of the informant material to the reliability of the informa-
tion he gives.' ' 7 This sweeping statement seems totally without
basis since common sense would indicate that the identity of the
informant and his reputation or characteristics should be very
important in determining his reliability.
Several other cases which cite Draper in this manner and
ignore the fact that there was disclosure in that case are Laive v.
United States, 28 Buford v. United States,129 Bruner v. United
States,30 and Jones v. United States. 3'
However, some of the courts have not made this mistake, but
have pointed out in their opinions' 3 2 that there was disclosure in
Draper. Of these, United States v. Robinson,'=3 represents what
would seem to be the correct analysis of the problem. That court
recognized that Draper was not controlling unless there was dis-
closure and then held -that, since without the tip there would be
no probable cause, the reliability of the informant was a central
issue, and it was, therefore, not error to require disclosure.
A second error made by some lower federal courts in this area
is undue emphasis on the question of whether or not the informer
was a direct participant in the arresting transaction. This fact has
no relevancy in determining the informant's reliability, which is
the main reason for requiring disclosure. The over-emphasis placed
on this factor arises from the Supreme Court's position in Ro-
viaro;3'4 but, as noted above, that emphasis was made with respect
to the necessity of disclosure for purposes of testimony at trial and
not with respect to reliability and probable cause. By incorrectly
emphasizing this factor the courts may deny disclosure when it
should be required.
A good example of such misplaced emphasis is Jones v. United
States3 5 where, on a motion to suppress for lack of probable cause,
the court held that Roviaro was inapplicable because it dealt with
a case where the informer helped set up the crime and took part
in it. Because that was not true of the informer in the case before
it, the court decided that Roviaro was not controlling. The court
failed to recognize that identity was relevant to the reliability of
127 Id. at 26.
128 321 F2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963).
129 308 F2d 804 (5th Cir. 1963).
130 293 F2d 621 (5th Cir. 1961).
'3' 271 F2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
132 United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963); Cochran v. United
States, 291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961).
3 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963).
134 Supra note 127.
135 271 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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the informer. To compound its error the court held that Draper
was applicable and controlling. The dissent in Jones is a good
example of the proper analysis in this type of case. It essays a
proper reading of Roviaro and recognizes that Roviaro and Draper
are inseparably intertwined.
Other examples of placing improper emphasis on the inform-
ant's lack of participation in the transaction are Mosco v. United
States' and United States v. Whliting.3T In both of these cases
the courts reached the correct result in refusing to order disclosure,
for in both cases there was sufficient corroboration of the hearsay
statement to establish probable cause independent of the inform-
ant's reliability. However, in both cases the courts devoted consider-
able time to distinguishing Roviaro on the basis of the informant's
participation in the transaction. Further pointing out the error of
the above mentioned courts are the numerous opinions in the
lower courts which analyze the problem correctly and hold that
disclosure on a motion to suppress depends on the degree of cor-
roborating evidence apart from the informant's reliability, not on
his participation in the act.'
Having observed when and why the courts do order disclosure,
it is helpful to note why the identity of the average informer is so
often a key factor in a determination of probable cause. The
informer, particularly the narcotics informer, is often himself en-
gaged in the same illicit business as the defendant and is often paid
for his information in cash, narcotics, immunity from prosecution,
or lenient punishment. Under such stimulation, it is to be expected
that the informer will not infrequently reach for shadowy leads or
even seek to incriminate the innocent. For instance, an investigation
of the situation in New York City in 1931 revealed that of one
hundred-fifty vice cases based on the reports of informers, forty
were found to have been falsely accused."" Figures such as these
make it plain that the defendant should be afforded the opportunity
to delve into the reliability of his informer, unless the independent
evidence corroborating his statement is strong enough to establish
probable cause without any doubt.
In addition, the advocate should take note of the following
three procedural points which may affect his client's case if a
problem of disclosure arises. First, the right to disclosure is not auto-
130 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1962).
137 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962).
138 United States v. Robinson, supra note 132; Buford v. United States, 308
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962) ;
Cochran v. United States, supra note 132; Peisner v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 67
(D. Md. 1961).
239 Hopkins, Our Lawless Police 105 (1931).
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matic. If the defendant does not make application to the court for
disclosure, he cannot complain on appeal regardless of the merits
of the potential claim.140 Second, even if disclosure is ordered, the
government is not the guarantor of the informer's appearance in
court.' 41 It is up to the defendant to find him, although the defend-
ant should be granted a stay to locate him.14 Third, if the de-
fendant knows who the informer is, an order refusing disclosure is
not error.1
43
Finally, there is the question whether the government can
avoid the implication and mandate of Roviaro-avoid the necessity
of disclosure-merely by making no attempt to inform itself fully
of the identity of its informers. The court in United States v.
OropezaI44 questions whether the government is under a duty to
make a good faith effort to get the names and addresses of inform-
ers, but this query appears never to have been satisfactorily an-
swered. It would seem that if the identity of an informer is neces-
sary to the fair determination of the cause, the defendant's rights
ought not be forfeited by reason of the government's intentional or
inadvertent failure to obtain such information.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has been an attempt to acquaint the practitioner
with some of the problems presented in determining the existence of
probable cause. Although no clear-cut statement can be made con-
cerning when a court will find probable cause to be present, it is
hoped that this article has provided its reader with helpful
guidelines.
In approaching probable cause by a factual analysis, it is
evident that the courts consider the factors of area, previous crim-
inal activity, and time, and effectively refuse to consider submission
to arrest or good faith on the part of the arresting officer. It also
appears likely that the extension of the exclusionary rule to the
states, inter alia, has resulted in a general dilution of the probable
140 United States v. Pepe, 247 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Walker,
246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Colletti, 245 F2d 781 (2d Cir. 1957).
141 United States v. Cimino, 321 F2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v.
Holiday, 319 F2d 775 (2d Cir. 1963); Williams v. United States, 273 F2d 781
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960); Eberhart v. United States, 262
F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1958).
142 United States v. White, 324 Fl2d 814 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v.
Glaze, 313 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1963); Sartain v. United States, 303 F2d 859 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962).
143 United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968
(1958).
144 275 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1960).
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cause standard. The evidentiary problems of probable cause center
around corroboration of the hearsay information and reliability of
the informer.
In the final analysis, the real dilemma presented by probable
cause is whether the rights of the individual should be preserved
at the expense of the protection of society. As Justice Cardozo
stated:
The question is whether protection for the individual would
not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society.
On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed.
On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the
insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice. 145
William C. Moul
145 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
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